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1. Introduction 
A key feature of postal markets today is the changing mix of mail sent by customers and 
processed by postal operators. While the demand for letters is in decline, predominantly 
because of e-substitution, parcel traffic is increasing as a result of the rapid growth of e-
commerce. Universal service providers (USPs) in the postal sector serve both markets. In the 
former, universal service obligations (USOs) are in place and regulators and private 
shareholders, where the USP is privatized, press for improvements in efficiency, in the case 
of regulators through the promotion of competition and the application of regulatory controls. 
In the latter, markets are highly competitive with parcel companies offering a wide range of 
differentiated services. In both markets, USPs are under pressure to increase efficiency and 
lower costs and prices to maintain financial viability and sustain profitability. But postal 
operations, and delivery in particular, are labor intensive. The pressure to raise efficiency and 
lower costs both current and future poses a threat of industrial action by employees and the 
effects of such action are likely to be greater the higher the rate at which USPs seek to 
increase efficiency. 
In a previous paper we considered some of these issues and trade-offs through a two-period 
model with a particular focus on mail as a whole, delivered through the universal service 
network, and the regulatory constraints under which USPs operate (De Donder et al., 2017). 
The current paper explores these themes in more detail and extends that earlier model in two 
main ways. First, the model considers separately letter and (bulk or contract) parcel services 
of the USP delivered through its universal service network. This separation allows the 
analysis to reflect the significant differences between the letter and parcel markets both in 
terms of their long term growth prospects and their cost structure. Second, the model expands 
its treatment of the effects of a potential strike on volumes and profitability, by allowing for 
an explicit diversion of traffic at the time of a strike from the USP to competitors. Further, the 
higher (lower) the USP’s target to improve efficiency, the greater (smaller) the likely change 
to work practices and reduction in its workforce and so resistance to such changes by labor, 
increasing (reducing) the adverse impact of a strike on the USP’s mail volume. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our model. Section 3 illustrates its 
operation with some numerical simulations based on a calibrated version of the model while 
Section 4 reports results for sensitivities on some key assumptions. Section 5 concludes. An 
appendix provides more detail on the analytics of the model and its calibration. 
2. The Model  
2.1 Operators and Markets 
The model we develop extends the one presented in De Donder et al (2017). In order for this 
paper to be self-contained, we outline all the building blocks of the model and further develop 
the model analytically in Appendix 1. 
                                                            
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their affiliated 
organizations. 
2 
 
There are two types of postal operators: a USP, denoted by I , and a set of competitors, 
denoted by E . There are four postal services: single-piece (SP) mail, bulk letters (BL), an 
access service for delivery of competitors’ BL through the USP’s network, and contract 
parcels (CP). We consider two delivery areas: a low cost urban one (U ), and a high cost, 
rural one ( R ). 
We describe the four postal services sequentially. The USP is subject to a USO to provide SP 
mail of a given quality and at the same price delivering to all addresses in both delivery areas. 
The USP enjoys a de facto monopoly on the SP mail market as competitors do not find it 
profitable to offer a competing SP service with these features. 
The USP faces competition on both the BL and CP markets. Competition in the BL market 
can be either end-to-end (E2E) or access with the USP then selling both an E2E BL product 
to final consumers, as well as an access service to competitors. In the case of access, each 
unit of competitors’ BL requires one unit of access to the USP delivery network. The BL 
products offered by both types of operators are imperfect substitutes, whether the competitor 
uses access or bypasses the USP delivery network. Competitors then choose the cheapest way 
to deliver (i.e., they offer an E2E product if the access charge is larger than their own delivery 
cost, and access the USP delivery network otherwise). The competitors charge an exogenous 
mark-up over their marginal cost in both cases whose level reflects the intensity of 
competition on the BL market. 
Competition on the CP market is of the E2E variety and there is no access to the USP 
delivery network for competitors. CP products sold by the USP and competitors are imperfect 
substitutes, and competitors charge an exogenous mark-up over their marginal costs. There is 
no substitution between SP mail, BL and CP. 
Both types of operators face constant variable costs. We further assume that the USO 
provided by the USP translates into this operator incurring also a fixed cost. 
2.2 Timing and decisions 
We consider two periods, denoted by P1 and P2. All firms announce their price for P1 at the 
beginning of P1. The USP chooses its BL and CP prices in order to maximize its profit. The 
USP faces two regulatory constraints on its prices. First, the SP mail price is capped at p  by 
the regulator (constraint C1) so that the USP is able to make a normal rate of return (that is, it 
breaks-even achieving zero economic profit and the margin made by selling all four types of 
services exactly covers the fixed cost of the USP). Second, the regulator sets a constraint on 
the USP’s access prices in the BL market. It can either cap the USP’s access price at a 
percentage mark-up over the USP’s downstream cost (constraint 2a) or set a margin squeeze 
constraint, such that the difference between the USP’s BL price and access charge cannot be 
smaller than the USP’s BL upstream cost (constraint 2b). The choice of constraint by the 
regulator impacts materially on whether entrants offer a BL service through access or 
bypass.2 As explained above, competitors set prices by posting an exogenous mark-up over 
their variable costs. 
The regulator then announces the specifics of the price constraints it will set during the next 
regulatory cycle, which is assumed to last five years, based on its assessment of prospects for 
mail demand and efficiency improvements. The regulator assesses the value of e , which is 
                                                            
2 There is a formal statement of these constraints in Appendix 1 where we also consider constraint C3: that the 
difference between the SP mail price and the USP’s BL price in any given zone must be greater than the 
upstream preparation costs of the USP’s BL final customers. 
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the yearly percentage reduction in (both variable and fixed) costs the USP could be expected 
to attain and sets the price cap p  and access price constraint for the second regulatory cycle. 
Reductions in costs may arise from improvements in productivity or lower wage costs or a 
mix of both factors. The value of e is assumed to be obtained from a rigorous efficiency 
review process undertaken in P1 that yields a challenging yet achievable estimate in P2.  
The USP then announces (in P1) efficiency targets to be achieved during the next regulatory 
cycle, but the value of e it chooses need not equal that used by the regulator to set its price 
constraint p . The announcement of efficiency targets by the USP is associated with risks of 
industrial action. 1SP  (respectively, 1NSP ) denotes the first-period when a strike does 
(respectively, does not) occur and it is assumed the regulator does not take into account the 
possibility of a strike when assessing its value of e .  
If a strike occurs, the USP is assumed not to adapt its prices in P1.3 The strike results in a 
decrease of 1 ( )
L e % in the USP’s SP and BL volumes in P1. If competitors use access in the 
BL market, they are similarly affected by the strike. If they deliver BL themselves, then a 
fraction 1
L  of the USP volume decrease diverts to competitors, whose volumes increase by 
1 1 ( )
L L e  % of the USP volumes. In the CP market, the USP volumes decrease by 1 ( )P e  
percent, but a fraction 1
P  of this decrease diverts to competitors, whose volumes increase by 
1 1 ( )
P P e  % of the USP volumes (see Appendix 1 for precise statements). The functions 1L
and 1
P  are both increasing in e , as the announcement of a larger decrease in costs is likely to 
result in more severe industrial action.4 
We now move to P2. The model assumes that the USP efficiency targets announced in P1 are 
achieved in P2 whether or not a strike occurred in P1 and, with a regulatory cycle of five 
years, USP costs decrease by 5 e  by the end of P2. For simplicity, competitors’ costs are 
assumed to be the same as in P1, such that e can be interpreted as the amount by which the 
USP lowers its costs each year relative to competitors. Market volumes are assumed to trend 
similarly for all operators, independent of postal prices. The total variation in these is given 
by the parameter   so that, for any given prices, mail volumes are  % higher in P2 than in 
P1. We assume (see Appendices 1 and 3) that letter volumes face a negative trend ( 0L   , 
due to e-substitution) while parcel volumes benefit from a positive trend ( 0P   , due to 
e-commerce).  
When a strike occurred in P1, USP SP volumes decrease by 2 ( )
L e % in P2. We assume that 
2 1( ) ( )
L Le e  since there is likely to be a reduced but continuing effect from the strike in P1 
due, for example, to additional e-substitution. The impact of a strike in P1 on BL volumes 
depends on the type of competition. If competitors use access to the USP delivery network, 
they are affected in the same way as the USP by the strike, with volumes decreasing by 
2 ( )
L e % for both in P2. If competition occurs with bypass, we contrast two scenarios (see 
Appendix 1 for more details). The “Full Reversion” scenario is equivalent to what happens 
                                                            
3 As explained at the end of this section, it would not wish to change them anyway. 
4 When choosing whether to access or bypass the USP delivery network, competitors do not anticipate that the 
form of competition they choose will affect the volume of their demand in case of a strike. We leave this 
extension for future research. 
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with access, with volumes of both operators decreasing by 2 ( )
L e %. Under the “Full 
Retention” scenario, market BL volumes also decrease, but there is also substitution in favor 
of the competitors.  
CP market volumes in P2 are not affected by whether a strike occurred or not in P1 but again 
we contrast two scenarios regarding the volumes of the USP when a strike occurred in P1. 
Under Full Reversion, traffic lost by the USP to competitors in P1 following a strike is 
assumed to revert in full in P2 to the USP. Under Full Retention, a fraction 2 ( )
P e of USP 
volumes diverts to competitors. Here also, we assume that 2 ( )
P e  is increasing in e   with 
2 1( ) ( )
P Pe e  .  
2SP  (respectively, 2 )NSP denotes the second-period when a strike did (respectively, did not) 
occur in P1. The USP then chooses prices for P2 to maximize profit in P2, subject to the price 
constraints C1 to C3 (see Appendix 1), its costs (given its choice of e ) and market demand 
during P2. The USP of course knows whether a strike occurred in P1, and can charge different 
prices accordingly. Competitors post their prices for P2 simultaneously. 
The USP’s profit is denoted by kj  in period = {1,2}k  whether a strike occurred in P 1  ሺ݆ ൌ
ܵሻ or not ሺ݆ ൌ ܰܵሻ. Observe that the same set of USP prices maximize kS and kNS  in the 
model because the impact of a strike is to scale down volumes by a given percentage, and 
prices which maximize a specific function also maximize a fraction of this function. So, 
prices will not differ between P2S and P2NS, and it does not matter whether first-period prices 
maximize 1 ,S  1NS  or any linear combination of the two. Note that prices in P 1  do not affect 
profit levels in P 2  (since they do not affect the strike outcome), so the assumption that prices 
in period = {1,2}k  maximize profit in the same period k  is innocuous, since the same sets 
of prices also maximize any weighted combination of profits in the two periods. Appendix 2 
explains how the USP weighs the two periods to evaluate overall discounted profit when 
considering the value of e  to set in period 1. The weights placed on profit in P 1  and P 2  are 
denoted respectively by 1w  and 2w  and discounted profit when a strike occurs is denoted by:  
1 1 2 2= ,S S Sw w    (1) 
while the discounted profit where a strike does not occur is:  
1 1 2 2= .NS NS NSw w    (2) 
3. Results from the Model: Low Access Prices Case 
For reasons of space, we illustrate the operation and results of the model for one of the two 
cases considered numerically in De Donder et al. (2017), namely that of low access prices in 
the BL market. Here constraint C2a determines the USP’s access prices and we assume that 
the regulator sets the value of the mark-up on the USP’ downstream cost at 10%, the 
regulator’s aim being to encourage competitive entry upstream in the value chain. We then 
obtain that the constraint C3 is not binding in the equilibria reported in this section.5 In 
addition to limiting the USP’s access prices, the regulator sets constraint C1, the price cap on 
SP mail, at a level (assuming no strike) that allows the USP to achieve zero economic profit 
                                                            
5 In simulations where the regulator constrains access prices using the margin squeeze constraint C2b we find 
that both C2b and C3 bind and competitors enter the BL market in the urban area through E2E competition 
rather than access. 
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when it sets profit-maximizing prices in the BL and CP markets.  Appendix 3 sets out the 
calibration assumptions applied in deriving the results reported in this section, which are 
based on published information or assumptions reflecting broadly the operation of postal 
markets in Europe. 
Results are reported in Table 1. The first column presents results for P1 in the case where no 
strike occurs in that period. In the BL market, entrants price at a mark-up of 2% over their 
variable costs including the access charge. The USP sets its profit-maximizing prices above 
those offered by entrants with prices for both being higher in the rural area than the urban, 
reflecting differences in delivery costs. By contrast, in the CP market competitors offer a 
higher specification service to senders than the USP and price at a mark-up of 3% over their 
variable costs. The USP’s profit-maximizing prices in the CP market are then below those of 
competitors with higher prices again in the rural area reflecting cost differences. In both the 
BL and CP markets, competitors gain more than 50% of the market although delivery of all 
BL is by the USP. At the base case calibration values, the  price cap on SP mail, ݌̅ , in P1 that 
would be required to be set by the regulator to allow the USP to breakeven is 1.49€ (against a 
fully allocated cost, or FAC, of 1). The cap is binding at equilibrium. 
The second column of Table 1 reports results for P1 for the case where there is a strike at the 
USP in P1. As outlined in Section 2, prices are unchanged from their no strike values. The 
effect of the strike on volumes depends on the efficiency target the USP is seeking to achieve 
in P2. The column reports outcomes for the case where that target is a 2% per annum 
improvement in efficiency. From Appendix 3, this results in a 12% loss in letter volume for 
both the USP and entrants as no access service can be offered either to non-USP operators 
during a strike. For parcels, the loss of volume by the USP is higher at 24% as alternative 
services are on offer from competitors and, of the USP’s volume loss, some 80% is assumed 
to switch to competitors so increasing their market share in P1. As a result of these volume 
losses, at these calibration values the USP makes a loss of economic profit of 335m€ and 
there is a drop in the net consumer surplus enjoyed by senders of SP mail. While prices in P1 
are unaffected by the USP’s target for efficiency in P2, the volume losses from a strike 
increase (decline) as that target increases (declines). For example, and although not shown in 
Table 1, from Appendix 3, if the USP were to seek a higher rate of efficiency improvement of 
3% per annum in P2 and a strike were to occur, the reduction in all letter volumes in P1 would 
be 16% and, of its parcels traffic, 32% (80% of which would switch to competitors). Its loss 
of economic profit would increase to 447m€. 
Letter volumes are declining by significant amounts in most developed countries while parcel 
volumes are growing rapidly. To reflect these trends in the numerical simulation of the 
model, in P2 it is assumed that both the SP and BL markets contract by 20% compared with 
the no strike volume level in P1 while the CP market expands by 20%. The USP seeks to 
reduce its costs relative to competitors and set profit-maximizing prices in the BL and CP 
markets. Table 1 reports these prices in the case where the USP achieves a 2% per annum 
reduction in its costs (10% in total by P2) consistent with an assumed value the regulator 
assesses is a reasonable rate of efficiency improvement by  the USP. The assumed passing 
through in full of lower USP costs in delivery into reduced access prices results in competitor 
prices declining by almost 10%. It is profit-maximizing for the USP to reduce its BL prices 
by about 7% (for example, to 0.274 in the urban area from 0.295) rather than 10% but BL’s 
share of contribution in P2 to the reduced fixed cost of 2.16bn€ still declines marginally 
compared with P1. 
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Table 1: Prices, Volumes and Economic Profit where Entry to Bulk Letter Market  
Through Access -  Alternative Industrial Action Scenarios  
  P1  P2 with 2% efficiency 
  Strike: Volume Effect Scenario
 No  
Strike 
Strike (2% 
efficiency) 
No  
Strike 
Full 
Reversion 
Full Retention by 
Competitors 
   to USP  
Prices, euro      
 USP, single piece 1.493     1.414  
 USP, bulk letters urban 0.295     0.274  
 USP, bulk letters rural 0.456     0.419  
 USP, access urban 0.209     0.188  
 USP, access rural 0.374     0.337  
 USP, contract parcels urban 1.735    1.678  
 USP, contract parcels rural 2.236    2.164  
 Competitors, bulk letters urban 0.234    0.212  
 Competitors, bulk letters rural 0.402    0.364  
 Competitors, contract parcels urban 2.06   2.06  
 Competitors, contract parcels rural 2.678     2.678  
Volumes, billions items 12.794 11.519 11.373   11.118 11.118 
 USP, total 5.657 4.905 4.923     4.800   4.645 
 USP, single piece 1.803 1.586 1.468    1.424 1.424 
 USP, bulk letters urban 2.615 2.301 2.135  2.071    2.071 
 USP, bulk letters rural 0.625 0.55 0.513  0.497    0.497 
 USP, contract parcels urban 0.487 0.37 0.640  0.640    0.517 
 USP, contract parcels rural 0.129 0.098 0.168  0.168    0.136 
 Competitors, total 7.136 6.614 6.450  6.318    6.474 
 Competitors, bulk letters urban 4.459 3.924 3.634  3.525    3.525 
 Competitors, bulk letters rural 0.879 0.773 0.739  0.716    0.716 
 Competitors, contract parcels urban 1.447 1.54 1.672  1.672    1.795 
 Competitors, contract parcels rural 0.351 0.376 0.405  0.405    0.437 
 Competitor share, bulk letters (%) 62% 62% 62%  62%     62% 
 Competitor share, contract parcels (%) 74% 80% 72%  72%     77% 
USP economic profit net of fixed costs1 0 -0.335 0  -0.048   -0.156 
 USP Contribution to profit 2.4 2.065 2.160  2.112    2.004 
 Competitor contribution to profit 0.142 0.146 0.152  0.152    0.162 
 Net consumer surplus (single piece mail) 4.062 3.575 3.366  3.265    3.265 
1 Billions, euros      
 
In the CP market where it is assumed also that the USP’s costs decline by 10% relative to 
competitors in P2, the USP’s profit-maximizing prices are only about 3% below those in P1 
(for example, 1.678 in the urban area from 1.735). This price cut leads the USP to gain 
market share and together with underlying growth in the CP market allows the USP to 
increase its volumes and raise its contribution to profit in P2 from parcels traffic. At the 
model’s base case calibration values these effects are sufficient to reduce the requirement 
from the SP market for contribution to fund the fixed cost of universal service. Consequently, 
the regulator can lower the price cap on SP mail by about 5% to 1.414 for the USP to 
breakeven in P2, albeit that this reduction  is less than in USP costs. 
The two final columns in Table 1 report results for P2 for the case where a strike occurs in P1 
while the USP is targeting an efficiency improvement of 2% per annum in P2. Two cases are 
reported. In the first, losses in volumes to competitors in the CP market from the strike in P1 
all revert to the USP in P2 although there are some continuing losses in letter demand for the 
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USP due to an assumption of increased e-substitution resulting from the strike. In the second, 
in addition to continuing losses in letter demand due to e-substitution, competitors in the CP 
market retain in P2 proportionately all of the volume they gained during the strike in P1. 
Equilibrium prices are the same with or without a strike in P1. In the full reversion case, the 
impact on letter volumes leads the USP make a loss of 48m€. There is also a loss of net 
consumer surplus on SP mail. In the full retention case, additionally the USP loses market 
share and contribution from the CP market resulting in a larger loss of 156m€. 
Although it is assumed that the regulator sets the SP price cap for P2 on the basis that the USP 
reduces its costs by 2% per annum, the USP may aim for a higher or lower rate of efficiency 
improvement. For example, if it chose to target a 3% improvement, its costs in P2 would be 
lower and so would its prices (although, as in the case of a 2% improvement, by less than the 
full reduction in costs). However, if a strike were to occur in P1, its impact on the USP’s 
volumes in both P1 and P2 would be more substantial. The cost reduction effect raises 
profitability compared with the 2% case while the strike effect lowers it. At a 3% reduction 
without a strike, the USP’s volumes and contribution per unit would be higher as would its 
economic profit in P2 at 212m€. However, if a strike were to occur in P1 in achieving this 
higher rate of efficiency improvement, this gain would be reduced to 146m€ in the full 
reversion case and to a loss of 11m€ where there is full retention in P2 of volumes gained 
from the USP by CP operators in P1. 
The relationship between efficiency, e , and the USP’s economic profit at equilibrium prices 
is examined further in Figure 1. Profits in P1 and P2 in the cases where there is no strike in P1 
(πNS), a strike in P1 with full reversion of CP volumes to the USP in P2 (πS full reversion) and 
a strike in P1 with full retention of CP volumes by competitors in P2 (πS full retention) are 
discounted to their present value in P1 using the approximate method outlined in Appendix 2. 
Figure 1 plots the present value of economic profits for the three cases at each value of e . 
Table 1 reported these prices and associated volumes for just one value of e , 2%. The 
schedule for the no strike case (πNS) rises approximately linearly in e . Lowering its costs 
allows the USP to reduce its prices relative to competitors so that, as reported in Table 1, it 
can both gain market share and raise profit contribution per unit. As its costs decline, the 
USP’s economic profit increases being zero at 2% (point A) by construction from the setting 
of the price cap on SP mail by the regulator. Failure to secure an efficiency improvement of 
at least 2% would lead to the USP making negative economic profits.  
The schedules for the two strike cases reflect a trade-off for the USP. A higher efficiency 
target for P2, if it leads to a strike in P1, results in a greater loss of profit in P1. But in P2, the 
USP’s costs and hence prices are lower so that contribution per unit and volumes increase 
raising profitability. At the base case calibration values the second of these effects is the 
stronger in the full reversion case (πS full reversion) and the present value of losses declines 
as e  rises. In the full retention case (πS full retention) the two effects roughly cancel over the 
range of values of e  reported in the figure and the present value of losses is broadly flat. 
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Figure 1: USP’s Economic Profit - No strike, Strike Full Reversion & Full Retention Scenarios  
 
4. Sensitivities on Key Assumptions 
It is important to assess the sensitivity of the results in Section 3 to plausible alternative 
assumptions for key variables and parameters in the model. In this section we consider four 
main groups of assumptions and their effects on economic profit: assumptions on volumes in 
P2 compared with P1; the impact of a strike in P1 on the USP’s volumes; the discount rate 
used to calculate the present value of profits; and the efficiency target in P2. The main results  
are summarized in Table 2.  
The first row records the present value of economic profits in the base case. These have been 
calculated at a discount rate of 10% using the approximate method outlined at Appendix 2. In 
the no strike case the USP achieves breakeven in both P1 and P2 by construction from the 
assumption that the regulator sets a price cap for SP mail to facilitate this outcome (point A, 
Figure 1). As reported in Table 1 also, a strike in P1 in the base case is modelled to result in a 
loss of 335m€. Where volume lost in that period reverts fully to the USP in P2 there is a loss 
to the USP in P2 of 48m€ while full retention of these volume gains by competitors in P2 
implies a larger loss of 156m€. The present values of these two scenarios are, respectively, -
0.995bn€ (point B) and -1.266bn€ (point C). 
The remaining rows of Table 2 report the impact of sensitivities to key assumptions as 
changes in the economic profit of the USP from the base case values. In the first of these, 
letter volumes are assumed to be 10% lower than the base case in P2 (and so 30% below their 
level in P1) and lower than expected by the USP or the regulator in setting its price cap on SP 
mail which it cannot then adjust to compensate for this unexpected shortfall. In present value 
terms the shortfall in volumes would lead to a loss of a little over 400m€ whether or not a 
strike occurred in P1. As discussed in Section 2, the USP’s profit-maximizing prices on its BL 
service would have been unaffected by the decline in volumes while access prices are set at 
the USP’s downstream cost in P2 plus a 10% margin. Relative to the base case the impact in 
the strike scenarios is slightly less than the no strike scenario because a strike is assumed to 
increase e-substitution in P2 and so reduce the volumes against which the 10% shortfall 
occurs. Note that if the regulator had expected letter volumes to decline by 30% rather than 
20%, it would have been necessary to set a higher price cap on SP mail to allow the USP to 
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breakeven. In this case the present value of economic profit would be zero but senders of SP 
mail would suffer a loss of net consumer surplus due to the higher SP price. 
In the second sensitivity, parcel volumes are assumed to outturn at 10% less than expected 
and increase by only 10% by the end of P2 rather than 20% as assumed in the base case. The 
prices set by the USP on its CP service are profit-maximizing but the reduced volume of 
parcels results in a lower contribution to the USP’s profit which cannot be made up by the 
USP from that service. Relative to the base case, the present value of this shortfall is about 
100m€ and smaller than that from a 10% shortfall in letters as CP mail is proportionately a 
smaller contributor to the USP’s profit. Again,  the change in profitability in the full retention 
strike scenario is smaller for under this the USP has lower CP volumes against which the 
10% shortfall occurs due to the strike.  
The third sensitivity examines the effect of the strike impact on volumes being 25% higher 
than assumed in the base. While the effect in P1 in the two strike scenarios is the same, the 
full retention by competitors in P2 of volumes gained in P1 has a greater negative impact on 
the USP’s profit. Both of the strike scenarios are significant with that for full retention adding 
losses of over 300m€ relative to the base case. 
Each of the three sensitivities on volumes has been on cases where it has been assumed that 
these are lower than in the base case. Within the model, if these effects had been in the 
opposite direction and it was assumed that  volumes were higher by the same amounts then 
the effects on profitability would have been reversed and to an approximation the changes 
above and below the base case reported in Table 2 are symmetric. 
 
 Table 2: Sensitivities to Key Assumptions - Changes to Economic Profit of USP from Base 
Case, €bns 1 
      Strike Volume Effect Scenario 
  
 
  
No 
Strike 
Full 
Reversion
to USP 
Full Retention 
by Competitors   
Base Case (2% Efficiency in P2) 0 -0.995 -1.266 
Changes in Economic Profit from Base Case:     
 Letter Volumes lower by 10% in P2 2 -0.428 -0.413 -0.415 
 Parcel Volumes lower by 10% in P22 -0.100 -0.100 -0.081 
 Strike Impact on Volumes higher by 25% 2 0 -0.249 -0.307 
 Discount Rate lowered from 10% to 5% 0 -0.065 -0.103 
 Base Case with 3% Efficiency in P2  0.453 0.116 0.012 
1 Calculated as present values in P1 using the approximate method outlined at Appendix section 2. 
2Changes affecting volumes approximately symmetric in opposite direction.  
 
The impacts also are approximately additive. For example, in the strike scenario of full 
reversion of volumes to the USP, if both letter and parcel volumes had been 10% lower in P2 
than assumed in the base and the strike effect higher by 25%, the change in economic profit 
from the base would have been approximately the sum of the individual effects or about -
760m€.  
The two remaining sensitivities in Table 2 are rather different in nature. The discount rate 
used to calculate present values in the base case is 10%. The sensitivity considers the impact 
of reducing this to 5% which clearly has no effect in the no strike case but values losses in P2 
for the two strike scenarios more highly and worsens the loss of economic profit relative to 
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the base. However, the impact of this change in the discount rate is not large reflecting the 
fact that the impact of a strike on profitability in the base case is assumed in the calibration to 
be greater in P1 than P2. The final row of Table 2 considers the impact on economic profit of 
increasing the target rate of efficiency improvement by the USP in P2 from 2% in the base 
case to 3%. These results were also reported graphically in Figure 1. A higher rate of 
efficiency improvement by the USP in P2 over that assumed by the regulator results in the 
USP lowering its costs and increasing its profitability if no strike from its SP, BL and CP 
services (point D). However,  if a strike were to occur in the process of achieving these 
increased efficiency gains its negative effect on profits would be greater than in the case of a 
2% efficiency target. In the full retention case reported in Table 2 the negative impact of a 
strike as assumed under the base case would more or less negate any gain in profitability 
from higher efficiency gains (point F) while in the full reversion case this gain would be 
modest (point E). 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has adopted and extended the framework developed by De Donder et al. (2017) to 
examine the challenge faced by a USP aiming to deliver efficiency gains, maintain financial 
viability and sustain profitability. In particular, our paper developed and calibrated a two-
period model (P1 and P2 ) to examine the challenges faced by a USP aiming to deliver 
efficiency gains in the future but which may lead to costly strike action in advance of these 
being achieved. 
Similar to De Donder et al. (2017) the model structure and assumptions consist of a number 
of key elements. First, letter volumes are in long term structural decline due to e-substitution. 
Second, there is a requirement for the USP to meet a pre-specified USO but entrants are not 
required to do so. Third, the USP is subject to price controls set by a regulator. Fourth, fixed 
costs are inherent in meeting the USO. However, we extend and develop the model in two 
important ways. In particular, we separate the letter and parcel services of the USP delivered 
through its universal service network to take account of significant differences in their longer 
term growth prospects and impacts on their respective volumes from a strike. In addition, we 
link the potential cost of strike action, which is assumed to occur in P1, to the magnitude of 
targeted efficiency gains that accrue in P2 to allow a richer modelling of potential strike 
impacts.  
Our model assumes a high level of competition in the bulk letters (BL) and contract parcels 
(CP) markets, with the USP competing against other letter and parcel operators, and that the 
regulator intervenes in the BL market by constraining the access prices the USP can set in 
delivering BL for competitors. In the paper we examine through a simulation of the model the 
case where these constraints lead to low access prices resulting in upstream BL competition 
in all geographies (rural and urban) and no bypass competition. In both the BL and CP 
markets, competitors gain more than 50% of the market in the model although, in the former, 
delivery of all BL is by the USP. Competition in the BL market leads to significant 
differences in prices between single-piece and BL traffic with competitors offering lower BL 
prices than the USP. However, as parcel competitors are assumed to offer a higher 
specification service their prices are higher than those of the USP.  
The USP is assumed to operate within a price control structure that requires a specific rate of 
efficiency to be achieved to maintain a normal rate of return (zero economic profit) during 
the next price control period if no strike takes place. In such an environment the USP is 
assumed to be able to achieve a higher/lower efficiency than this specific level but runs the 
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risk of an increasing/decreasing risk of industrial action whose potential costs, if a strike is 
triggered, increase with the scale of targeted efficiency.  
In the event of a strike being avoided our results suggest that the USP’s profit could increase 
considerably if it were to target higher rates of efficiency. However, our modelling also 
indicates that if a strike occurs the USP will suffer significant losses that cannot be recouped 
during the price control period. The main factors underpinning this result are two-fold. First, 
industrial action results in lost volume and revenue during the strike which over the longer 
term encourages further losses as both senders and recipients of mail switch away from 
physical mail and adopt electronic alternatives. Second, a significant proportion of parcel 
traffic is assumed to switch to existing parcel competitors. With regards to the latter, the 
extent of the loss suffered by the USP will depend on the quantity of contract parcels the USP 
loses during the strike period (that is, switch to competitors or customers decide to not send 
in P1) and how much of this returns when the strike is over as well as efficiency gains 
achieved (in P2 ).  
The paper concludes with a number of sensitivities being run to assess the potential impact of 
plausible alternative assumptions. Four in particular, are worth noting: first, the impact of 
lower than expected letter and parcel volumes (due, say, to changes in market conditions) 
could have a substantial negative impact on the USP’s finances. Second, the industrial action 
sensitivity suggests that if the extent of traffic loss associated with strike action differed from 
the base case, this could impact the results considerably. However, given the high losses 
assumed under the two base case strike scenarios this suggests the final outcome could be 
significantly worse or just somewhat less bad. Third, the lower discount rate sensitivity 
results in present values that give greater weight to the value of losses in P2 and worsens the 
loss of economic profit relative to the base case. Fourth, achieving higher efficiency rates and 
avoiding strike action can result in considerably higher levels of economic profit, but much of 
this gain can be lost if securing these efficiency improvements results in significant industrial 
action. 
 
Appendix 
1) Analytical model.  
The net utility that consumers in zone { , }i U R  obtain from consuming quantity x  of SP mail at 
unit price p  is denoted by ( ) .iu x px  
The demand function for SP mail in zone i  is obtained by maximizing utility with respect to x , and 
is denoted by ( )ix p . Utility is quadratic in quantities, so that the demand function is linear and of the 
form ( ) = .x p p   The utility function ( )iu x  is calibrated (see Appendix 3) and used to obtain 
the demand function in P1NS. In P1S, demand is given 1(1 ( )) ( )
L e x p . In P2NS, volumes are given by 
(1 ) ( )L x p  while they are given by 2(1 )(1 ( )) ( )LL e x p    in P2S. 
The unit variable cost for SP mail is denoted by ic . The contribution to USP profit of SP mail in zone 
i  is then ( ) ( )i ip c x p in P1NS, and is obtained similarly by replacing ( )ix p  by the relevant demand 
function (see above) in P1S, P2NS and P2S. 
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The net utility obtained by consumers in zone i from consuming BL is ( , ) ,I E I I E Ei i i i i i iv y y q y q y   
where jiq  denotes the consumer price operator { , }j I E  posts in zone i , and jiy  the quantity 
consumed of that good. The demand for goods in each zone is obtained by maximizing the 
consumers’ utility, and is denoted by ( , )I I Ei i iy q q  and ( , )
E I E
i i iy q q . Note that both operators’ prices 
influence demand for both goods, because the function iv  is non separable in 
I
iy  and 
E
iy . The utility 
function (.)iv  is quadratic in quantities, so that BL demand functions are linear in prices. Appendix 3 
details how we calibrate utility and demand functions for BL in P1NS.  
As for BL costs, jid  denotes operator j ’s (constant) marginal delivery cost in zone i , and 
j
ib  
operator j ’s upstream constant unit cost in zone i . If the access charge ia  is smaller than the 
competitor’s delivery cost Eid , the competitor chooses to access the USP’s delivery network in zone 
i  and charges a price (1 )( )E E Ei L i iq m a b   . If Ei ia d , the competitor prefers to offer an E2E 
product in zone i , whose price is (1 )( )E E E Ei L i iq m d b   . 
 
In P1S, demands are given by 1(1 ( )) ( , )
L I I E
i i ie y q q  for the USP, and, for the competitors, by 
1(1 ( )) ( , )
L E I E
i i ie y q q  if access occurs in zone i , and by 1 1( , ) ( ) ( , )E I E L L I I Ei i i i i iy q q e y q q   if 
bypass occurs. In P2NS, volumes are given by (1 ) ( , )I I EL i i iy q q  and (1 ) ( , )E I EL i i iy q q , 
respectively. Volumes in P2S depend on whether access takes place or not. Under access, and bypass 
with the “Full Reversion” scenario, volumes are given by 2(1 )(1 ( )) ( , )
L I I E
L i i ie y q q    and 
2(1 )(1 ( )) ( , )
L E I E
L i i ie y q q   . Under bypass and the “Full Retention” scenario, volumes are given 
by Ret2(1 )(1 ( )) ( , )
L I I E
L i i ie y q q   and LRet2 2(1 )( ( , ) ( ) ( , ))E I E L I I EL i i i i i iy q q e y q q    .  
The contribution to USP’s profit of BL in zone i  is given by 
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )I I I I I E I E I Ei i i i i i i i i i iq b d y q q a d y q q     in P1NS, in case of access, and by 
( ) ( , )I I I I I Ei i i i i iq b d y q q   in case of bypass. Contributions to profit are obtained similarly in P1S, P2NS 
and P2S by modifying adequately the demand functions. The contribution to competitor’s profit of BL 
in zone i  is given by ( ) ( , )E E E I Ei i i i i iq a b y q q   in P1NS in case of access, and by 
( ) ( , )E E E E I Ei i i i i iq d b y q q   in case of bypass. They are obtained similarly in P1S, P2NS and P2S by 
modifying adequately the demand functions. 
The net utility obtained by consumers in zone i from consuming CP is ( , ) ,I E I I E Ei i i i i i iw z z s z s z   
where jis  denotes the consumer price operator { , }j I E  posts in zone i , and jiz  the quantity 
consumed of that good. The demand for goods in each zone is obtained by maximizing the 
consumers’ utility, and is denoted by ( , )I I Ei i iz s s and ( , )
E I E
i i iz s s . Note that both operators’ prices 
influence demand for both goods, because the function iw  is non separable in 
I
iz  and 
E
iz . The utility 
function (.)iw  is quadratic in quantities, so that CP demand functions are linear in prices. Appendix 3 
explains how we calibrate utility and demand functions for CP in P1NS . In P1S, demands are given by 
1(1 ( )) ( , )
P I I E
i i ie z s s  and 1 1( , ) ( ) ( , )E I E P I I Ei i i i i iz s s e z s s  , respectively. In P2NS, volumes are given 
by (1 ) ( , )I I EP i i iz s s  and (1 ) ( , )E I EP i i iz s s . Volumes in P2S depend on the scenario considered. In 
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the “Full Reversion” scenario, volumes are the same as in P2NS . In the “Full Retention” case, they are 
given by 2(1 )(1 ( )) ( , )
P I I E
P i i ie z s s    and  2(1 ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )E I E P I I EP i i i i i iz s s e z s s   . 
The constant unit variable cost for CP for operator j  in zone i  is denoted by jif . There is no need to 
distinguish upstream and downstream costs as no access is provided for this good. The competitors’ 
price is (1 )E E Ei P is m f  . 
The USP also faces a fixed cost F , due to being required to meet the USO. 
The USP faces three price constraints, the second of which can take either of two forms.  
The first constraint is a simple cap on the SP mail price set by the regulator: .p p  (C1)  
The second constraint is on the access prices that the USP can charge and is determined by the 
regulator. It can take either one of two forms: a pre-specified mark-up on the USP’s downstream cost  
(1 )I Ii L ia m d  , (C2a) 
as applied in the numerical simulations in this paper ; or a margin squeeze constraint: the difference 
between the USP’s BL price and access charge, in any zone i , must be at least equal to upstream 
FAC of the USP in that zone:  
 (1 ),I Ii i iq a b     (C2b) where   is the FAC factor.  
The third constraint is that the difference between the (higher) SP mail price and the USP’s (lower) 
BL price, in each zone, must be greater than the upstream preparation cost of the USP’s BL final 
customers, ܾ௣ : 
I p
ip q b   (C3), { , }i U R .  
2) Weighting of the two periods.  
P1 and P2 are both the last year of a five year regulatory cycle. In the case where a strike does occur in 
P1, the USP’s profit levels in P1 and P2 are, respectively, 1S  and 2S . A linear progression is 
assumed from the final year of P1 to P2, and a yearly discount factor of  where   ൌ 1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ and ݎ 
is the discount rate. The discounted value of the USP’s profit over six years , evaluated in P1, is given 
by  
 
5
2 1
1 1
=1 5
i S S
S S
i
i          1 1 2 2= S Sw w    
where  
 
2 3 4
1
5 4 3 2= ,
5
w         
2 3 4
2
1 2 3 4 5= .
5
w          
We proceed similarly with 1NS  and 2NS  (see equation (2)). 
3) Calibration for simulations.  
(A) Demand. For SP mail, BL and CP markets, when the retail price of the good considered is the 
same in both zones, the urban zone represents 80% of total volumes, and the rural zone 20%. SP mail 
market: at a price of 1, price elasticity is -0.2 (both zones) and total volume 2bn items. BL market, 
hypothetical monopoly setting: at a price of 0.4, demand price elasticity of -0.4 (in both zones), and 
total volume of 7.5 billion items. With competition, displacement ratio 
( , ) / / ( , ) /I I E E E I E Ei i I i i i I iy q q q y q q q           of 0.9. Market share of 25% for competitors when 
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= = 0.4I Ei iq q  and of 50% when = 0.4
I
iq  and = 0.36.
E
iq  In the CP market the USP price in the 
urban (resp., rural) area is 1.9 (resp., 2.4) and competitors are 10% more expensive than the USP 
while (i) the displacement ratio is 0.75, (ii) the demand price elasticity is -0.2, (iii) the USP volume is 
0.4 (resp., 0.1), (iv) the USP’s market share is 35%. For equal USP and competitors’ prices, the USP’s 
market share is 10%.  
(B) Costs (in P1).  
SP mail market: unit variable cost ic  of 0.57 in urban area ( i U ) and 0.72 in rural area ( i R ). 
BL market: same upstream variable cost in both zones for both operators: =I E I EU U R Rb b b b  =0.02.  
Upstream preparation cost of the USP’s BL final customers: pb =0.15. USP’s downstream cost: IUd
=0.19 and IRd =0.34. Competitors’ downstream cost: 
E
Ud =0.28 and 
E
Rd =0.74. 
CP market: unit variable costs: IUf =1.14, 
I
Rf =1.44, 
E
Uf =2, 
E
Rf =2.6. 
USP: fixed cost of = 2.4F ; and FAC factor   of 2/3.  
All (variable and fixed) USP costs decrease by 5e% between P1 and P2. 
(C) Mark-ups.  
USP mark-up for access charge set by the regulator where constraint C2a applies: = 0.1ILm . 
Competitors’ mark-up in BL market: = 0.02ELm ; and in CP market: = 0.03
E
Pm . 
(D) Exogenous variations in volumes 
Exogenous volume trend between P1 and P2: = 0.2L  and = 0.2P .  
Volume loss by the USP in the case of a strike in P1 as a proportion of the USP’s pre-strike volume 
1 ( ) = 0.04 4
L e e  , 2 ( ) = 0.01L e e  , 1 ( ) = 0.08 8P e e  and 2 ( ) = 0.064 6.4P e e   where e is 
expressed as a proportion (for example, e  = 2% as e  = 0.02). 
Volume loss by the USP for BL under the “Full Retention” scenario in P2S: Ret2 ( ) = 0.03 3
L e e  . 
 Volume diversion in P1S: 1
L =0.5 and 1P =0.8; and for BL under the “Full Retention” scenario in 
P2S: 2
L =2/3. 
(E) Discount factor for present value calculation 
Discount rate of 10%:  = 0.91; 5%  = 0.95  
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